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Abstract
Iran is facing a daunting reality regarding the future of their water resources
which may result in conflict and migration within the country with the potential to affect
the Middle East and North African region and beyond. The country has failed to address
critical preservation, risk mitigation, infrastructural, and political efforts to accommodate
their rising population due to economic expansion. Water resources are dependent on
social, political, economic, and environmental variables related to conflict and migration.
Given the recent examples of water security issues in Syria resulting in migration and
conflict, this thesis investigates the total available water per capita as a driver for the
potential collapse of Iran’s water resources. Portions of two key world system dynamics
models were combined to identify interrelated variables leading to migration and conflict.
It was found through multiple simulations that decreasing water per capita levels leads to
increases in aggregated migration and death rates for this particular investigation. Further
experimentation with other interrelated variables such as civil liberties, level of
government, and GDP per capita may highlight other drivers and allow extension of this
model to other countries of interest.
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WATER SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING MIGRATION AND CONFLICT IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
I. Introduction
Recent conflicts and migrations around the globe have drawn the attention of
military strategists and leaders who are interested in which environments are particularly
vulnerable to impact stability, especially when conflict is imminent. Conflict and
migration are complex issues which become even more convoluted when combined.
Military forces conducting offensive, defensive, sustainment, and humanitarian
operations must understand how to adapt to these issues within a given operational
environment.
There are a number of varying degrees of interdependency between water
security, migration, and conflict within a region, country, or population. These causes can
vary in intensity, frequency, and influence each other resulting in complex
interdependencies. They are linked through social, economic, political, and
environmental aspects within a community, country, and region. Within these aspects,
there are both exclusive and common variables at play, weighing on the potential
outcomes.
Major events involving water security, conflict, and migration have recently
occurred in countries such as Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. For example, Syria suffered
from an extensive drought from 2006-2010 that negatively affected their agricultural
sector, forcing an internal migration from rural to urban areas as farmers and pastoralists
sought employment and social opportunities. As resources became more overexploited,
tensions in cities such as Aleppo and Damascus inevitably rose, resulting in protests and
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ultimately violence as the oppressive Assad-backed regime stepped in to the unrest. Civil
war ensued, millions became internally displaced or left the country altogether to flee
conflict and enjoy opportunities in a safer environment.
The fragility of Syria is not unique to the region of the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA). Most of the countries suffer from some level of resource scarcity,
especially water, mostly due to rising populations, arid conditions, and waning
preservation efforts in the form of sustainability, services, and risk mitigation [1]. The
Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) is of particular interest due to a rapidly expanding
population that has more than doubled in the last 40 years. This growth is coupled with
the consumption of water at an unprecedented rate due to a lack of more modern and
sustainable resource, risk, and service management. Iran’s water resources are being
overexploited as their agricultural sector continues over abstraction of fossil aquifers and
transboundary surface waters even after investing millions in dam infrastructure to meet
self-imposed food self-sufficiency directives [2].
Iran recently has experienced violent protests due to rising costs and reduced
government subsidies in the wake of lifting trade sanctions. Iran experienced a huge
economic growth as inflation rates soared and the government supported subsidies on key
commodities such as fuel under President Ahmadinejad in preparation for sanctions being
lifted. As President Rouhani ushered in new impositions on Iranians to reduce
government spending, a backlash by the people has ensued due to waning subsidies, lack
of employment opportunities, and dwindling resources. This example generalizes a link
between water security and conflict as a simple introduction to the complexities they
share.
2

The purpose of this research is to identify potential triggers signaling the collapse
of Iran’s water resources and possible subsequent incidences of conflict and migration.
Extensive research on the subjects of water security, conflict, and migration are necessary
to systematically qualify and quantify variables linking these subjects through social,
political, economic, and environmental lenses. Applying these variables towards a
simulation model provides a framework for the investigation of future incidences in Iran
and other countries of interest.
Background of the Problem
The United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM, has expressed an
interest in understanding and analyzing the burgeoning issue of water security and its
potential interdependency with migration and conflict. Water security has become more
prevalent in recent decades as populations grow, pollution spreads, and populations
engage in conflict over resources. Special Forces units operate in environments where
resources are often scarce, typically before the sustainment offered by large scale
campaigns and operations is established. Sustainment operations enable a force to
continue operations without significant lack of proper supplies and materials. Operating
in an environment without sustainment or sufficient supplies to source in the host nation
limits the reach and capabilities of any force. While the former point is interesting, the
purpose of this thesis focuses on identifying the potential sensitivity of the scarcity and
triggers of these issues so as to enable forces operating in austere environments suffering
from migration, water security, and/or conflict.
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Islamic Republic of Iran
This research focuses on the water security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran)
along with potential affects due to migration and conflict. Other aspects of Iran will be
included in order to reinforce an understanding of these topics as it relates to the research,
but not so much as to obscure the overall intent.
Iran possesses several water sources from key geographical features allowing one
of the highest usages of water for agricultural purposes (see Figure 1). Iran covers 1.75 M
km2 and is bordered by, Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east, the Gulf of Oman, the
Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to the south, Iraq and Turkey to the west, and
Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan to the north. The majority of
land is desert and mountains, some of which rise above 2000 m. The large Central
Plateau covers more than half of the country, includes a salt swamp, and is located
between several mountain chains. Nearly 30 percent of the land is cultivable, of which
approximately 40 percent is utilized annually. Iran is a semi-arid to arid country with
extreme temperature fluctuations (55oC to -30oC) and a rainfall average of 275 mm with
the majority of precipitation arriving in the winter months [3].
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(Source: UN FAO AQUASTAT)

Figure 1: Major Iranian Water Features
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Iran is a country of 80.2 million people with nearly three-quarters of them
residing in urban areas, contrasting the fact that 92 percent of the country’s water is for
agricultural use versus nearly seven percent for municipal use and just over one percent
for industrial usage. Population growth is the starting point for water issues in Iran; its
population more than doubled since the Revolution in 1979. The capital city of Tehran
contains over 18 percent of the population. As the spatial distribution of population grows
more toward the cities, water resources must move as well. As Iran continues toward the
stated goal of food self-sufficiency, water is overexploited from both renewable and
nonrenewable resources in an effort to grow an increasing amount of food.
Other issues plague Iran’s precious water resources while the country struggles
towards becoming a global economic power. The country relies on 60 percent of its water
from sustainable or renewable sources with more than 55 percent originating from
groundwater versus surface water. In addition, small fraction of water is sourced through
desalinization. Water tariffs are very low and subsidies high in Iran. Up until recently,
fuel prices were affordable for nearly all residents, allowing inefficient pumping and
over-abstraction of groundwater. Iran built hundreds of small and large dams in an effort
to combat population spatial distribution as well as support the agricultural efforts, but
many of these dam systems are now unused due to inadequate flow and a plethora of
environmental issues.
Iran has a rich history of water management. The Persians developed the qanat
millennia ago in order to transport water under the surface towards irrigation reservoirs,
which many are still maintained and used today. Iran continues using technology and has
invested in modern inter-basin water transfer (IWT) projects to connect water rich areas
6

near the mountain watersheds and Caspian Sea towards urban areas, although not without
controversy. These efforts are largely done to offset insufficient water resources, but also
as mitigation for environmental issues such as droughts and floods. Other environmental
issues include potential climate change affects, wastewater mismanagement,
desalinization affects, and a lack of conservancy awareness on behalf of the population
and government.
Iran’s government has failed to properly manage water resources, infrastructure,
and risk mitigating efforts for the increasing demands of a growing population. In the
next chapter, several of these issues will be further explored and compared with other
countries who shared similar water resource failures and subsequently endured migration
and/or conflict events. Many of these issues are not unlike the situation in the U.S.
southwest, where the Colorado River has been overexploited for decades by huge
aqueducts diverting water towards Californian cities. The Colorado now fails to run its
natural course to the Gulf of California in Mexico.
Statement of the Problem
Currently, no regional dynamic water security models exist that incorporate
migration and conflict. Several global models exist that have predicted available water
resources [4]–[6]. Other local models forecast water security, but lack interactions of
migration and conflict [7]–[9]. Extensive research has been conducted on water security
—causes, effects, predicted outcomes, policy reforms, and resource securitization to
name a few [10]–[12]. Additionally, U.S. water provision and management efforts have
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varied domestically and with foreign states which is evident from large infrastructure
nation building project conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 [13, p. 30].
The majority of human migratory models include the ‘push-pull’ or gravity
theory, where origin-nation factors are ‘pushing’ individuals away and host-nation factors
are ‘pulling’ individuals towards their borders. These models allow researchers to explain
the migratory structure based on a population’s reaction towards origin and host nations
events to include an understanding of the consequences of such migration. Fussel et al.
used micro-level demographics in the form of surveys and to analyze and model
environmental aspects of human migration [14]. Greenwood investigated migration
drivers for U.S. citizens between 1965 and 1983 using microdata and time-series data
based on familial and economic variables [15]. Edwards posits that most research and
models miss accounting for critical social drivers of migration, linking individual
decisions with the larger factors affecting their communities [16]. While these researchers
created fairly accurate migratory models, they noted their results were limited to specific
instances in time given the available data such that further research on an expanded scale
would require additional variables.
The causes of conflict are entrenched in social, political, economic, cultural and
environmental factors, much like migration. Research often highlights inequalities within
classes or groups that alienate them based on education, employment, ethnicity, religion,
clan, and resources. Extensive research has been conducted on the fundamental causes of
conflict, with particular attention to the horizontal inequalities existing between groups
within a country or state [17], [18] that required further review for our purpose. Due to
the inherent nature of warfighting, analyzing causes of conflict for the sponsor has less
8

priority than migration and water security and therefore will be cursory within this
research.
Purpose of the Study
Water security can negatively influence a number of operational capabilities,
including operational reach, sustainment, and flexibility. Acknowledging water security
causes in an operational environment enables the Department of Defense, DoD, to
anticipate and include its effects into mission planning, preparation, and execution.
Determining a baseline (minimum) number of contributing factors allows other military
research to more accurately model these interactions in the future. The U.S. military is
interested in the overall stability of global partners, especially those whose resources are
scarce and may be of interest for contingency planning. Finally, U.S. efforts to help
stabilize or reinforce the infrastructure of these developing countries sends powerful
signals of responsibility and strength to burgeoning and competing superpowers [13].
Significance of the Study
There are a number of potential water scarce environments DoD may conduct
operations in during the coming years. By anticipating potential water security
interdependencies of operational and mission variables, DoD may increase readiness and
reduce the negative influence on operational capabilities. They may also be more
informed about evolving patterns in other regions of the globe while forecasting planning
efforts in migration prone regions. This topic also clearly impacts the concepts for human
aspects in military operations.
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Significance to Leadership
Presenting a model capable of simulating the interaction of water security,
migration, and conflict permits follow on research for expanded models with more
factors. Expanded models will be more accurate in predicting the effects of additional
influencers within an operational environment.
Nature of the Study
The research and methodologies applied in this thesis are computationally based
analyses focused in the operational sciences. For the purpose of simulating water
security, migration and conflict, the primary modeling technique utilized is system
dynamics (SD). System dynamics offers a holistic approach, incorporating as many
system elements as possible, with the time available to conduct this research. Statistical
and linear regression techniques are applied to various continuous data sources in order to
determine interdependencies between elements and create equations to describe flows
within the system dynamic model [19]. Scenarios are generated to support a design of
experiments in order to exercise the limits of available data sources.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Using past and current hydrology and demographic data, this study models water
security and its effects on migration and conflict by identifying indicators related to the
stated problem. The state of critical water insecurity, rate of migration, and type of
conflict will be further defined. Available narrative and analysis sources support Iran’s
lack of water security. Within this thesis, these sources are explored for corroborating
data in order to support our modeling and analyses. Prior to addressing the analyses,
10

significant exploration and explanation water security encompassing management,
sustainment, policy, delivery, economy, environment, and population will also be
explored in order to address several questions.
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas?
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify a particular country’s water
security?
3. Does the amount of per capita renewable water resources available serve as a
trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within a country?
These questions are addressed throughout this thesis in order to meet the hypothesis that
water security fails due to a decrease of per capita renewable water resources available
below 800 𝑚𝑚3 /𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦. This value is selected on the occurrence of internal displacement of

personnel in Syria prior to the protests in 2011, the proceeding civil war, and mass
migration and refugee flow from the country.
Definition of Terms

A number of key terms are used throughout the research. Water scarcity is the
lack of sufficient water supply to meet the immediate demands of water users or
consumers. Water security is the availability and access of sufficient quantities of a safe
quality in order to sustain livelihoods without negatively affecting the environment in
order to promote development. Migration is the movement of a person or persons from
one location to another. People that migrate are called migrants and can be categorized as
internally displaced persons or refugees. Internally displaced persons are migrants who
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are without a permanent residence within their legal country of citizenship. Refugees are
migrants who have been forcibly removed from their residences and either cannot return
or fearful for their life if they were to return. Refugees can be internally displaced within
their country or have left the country. Conflict is the disagreement between two or more
entities. These entities can include, for example, political parties, extremist groups,
neighboring ethnicities, or combatants. More detailed definitions are presented in the
literature review of this thesis.
Study Scope
Causes of migration and conflict are numerous and their interdependencies
convoluted. Water security was selected as a hypothesized cause by this research’s
sponsoring party. The topic of water scarcity is included with the parent issue, water
security. Simulating water security requires a scientific model, which for this research is
defined using a system dynamics methodology.
Study Limitations
There are many factors causing migration, conflict, and water security
individually, in addition to an interdependent whole. This research focuses on observable
data and narrative to combine the extensive research conducted from various disciplines.
Much of the narrative on water security typically included references to climate change
including precipitation, temperature, and weather patterns. Associated correlations
between climate change and its potential causes are not explored in this study.
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Summary
This research includes significant and important insights into modeling and
simulating water security to identify potential effects on migration and conflict using
operational science methodologies. The literature review presents a background on the
topics of water security, migration, conflict, and system dynamics. The models and
analysis presented in this thesis build on many previous works involving global water
models. While world water models may showcase scarcity across the globe, a more
regionalized or localized model is required to simulate water security in support of DoD
strategies and operational planning efforts in various operational environments.
Water, migration, and conflict data exist for many industrialized nations. Many of
the potential operational environments that the DoD is interested in lack sufficient data
required to perform extensive classical simulation. The methodologies within chapter
three model and simulate the interdependencies of the variables and elements with
available open source data. Following the testing and experimentation, analyses are
performed and results presented in chapter four. Finally, the conclusions of the research
are presented in chapter five along with offerings for follow on research.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
This chapter presents an overview sources pertinent to water security, migration,
and conflict, as well as methodologies by which these topics can be modeled. This
research is dependent on representing the topics accurately to present a robust model for
simulation. The relationships between the topics are well documented by various experts
in a wide range of scientific fields including hydrology, climatology, sociology, and
political science. The available research has stressed, and continues to stress, the
importance and critical requirement to address water security, conflict, and migration; yet
a methodology to model the interaction is absent. Additionally, contributing factors to the
problem both underlap and overlap further convoluting the modeling and simulation
process. Each topic is examined individually to build a cumulative knowledge of the
problem and how it applies in the country of Iran. Issues, subjects, and data pertinent to
Syria and Iran will be included to support and reinforce the subsequent modeling and
simulation in later chapters.
Water Security
Water security was defined by Grey, Sadoff, and Claudia [20, p. 546] as the
availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods,
ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to
people, environments, and economies. The United Nations (UN) presents an expanded
definition by stating that water security is
the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities
of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and
14

socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne
pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate
of peace and political stability [21, p. 1].
The UN pointed out in their World Water Development report that water security is the
“availability of a reliable and secure access to water over time.” [12, p. 379]. This
mention of time is an important characteristic when assessing water scarcity and water
security.
Defining water scarcity is necessary when considering water security. Simply
stated, water scarcity occurs when water supply does not meet water demand. The UN
reports individuals begin experiencing water stress when the annual supply is less than
1,700 m3, water scarcity below 1,000 m3, and absolute scarcity below 500 m3 per person
[12, p. 124]. As an example, recent water shortages in South Africa have restricted Cape
Town residents to absolute scarcity at 6.6 gallons per day (9.12 m3/year), which equates
to 0.97% of their total renewable water resources per capita per year [22]. Progressing
towards a more contextual definition in a seminal work regarding environmental scarcity
linked to violent conflicts, Homer-Dixon [23] defined the term “environmental scarcity”
as subjective and not immune to policy or economy. From his perspective, environmental
scarcity is the result of unequal resource access due to the combination of a decrease in
quality and quantity of renewable resources along with population growth.
Water scarcity has been assessed in several ways based primarily on supply and
demand. However, water scarcity assessments have typically accounted for water
quantity, not necessarily water quality. Zeng, Liu, and Savenije stated that three known
water scarcity assessments (Falkenmark index, Criticality ratio, and IWMI indicator) fail
to account for water quality and a fourth assessment, water poverty index, is complicated
15

to calculate or explain [24]. Their research applied a new water scarcity index since water
use, pollution, and excessive withdrawal impacts affects not only water quantity, but
water quality. Nevertheless, the state of water quality and scarcity requires an
understanding of water resources, and in particular, the country of interest, Iran.
Water Resources
Iran relies very little on external water resources and is therefore dependent upon
precipitation to recharge groundwater aquifers and replenish flow to the watershed.
Watersheds naturally transport water to lakes, rivers, oceans, and aquifers while manmade aqueducts channel water to or from rivers and reservoirs, usually formed by a dam.
As mentioned in the introduction, the majority of the water in Iran is sourced internally
from surface water, which is comprised of water flowing over or stored on or above the
ground level. Surface water includes transboundary rivers originate in other countries, but
may transit through to a downstream country, or may cease within before reaching
another body of water.
Water for use and consumption originates from the natural water cycle, which
includes the watershed, and from deep underground in fossil aquifers. Fossil aquifers are
formed over thousands of years as water seeps through the Earth’s crust layers into sealed
caverns. Fossil aquifers are considered non-renewable water resources due to the time
required to fill them. These aquifers are typically quite deep, some down to 2,000 m
below the surface, and often require a great deal of specialized technology and energy to
extract. For this reason, most countries have focused their attention towards renewable
water resources as non-renewable water resources cannot be certain to hold sufficient
quantities or quality for use and consumption.
16

Renewable Water Resources
Water resources are quantified through physical measurements and qualitatively
assessed through various social, economic, political, and environmental aspects.
Quantitatively, water resources are determined through the stocks and flows of total
renewable water resources [25], which are further defined by internal and external or
IRWR and ERWR, for brevity. A nation’s internal resources, consists of both surface and
groundwater available from the land, are calculated based on surface runoff, groundwater
recharge, groundwater drainage, and seepage. These quantities are modelled [26] as:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝐼𝐼 − (𝑄𝑄
−�
𝑄𝑄��
��𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
����
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(1)

where R is the surface runoff, the total volume of the long-term average annual flow of
surface water generated by direct runoff from endogenous precipitation, I is the
groundwater recharge, generated from precipitation within the country, Qout is the
groundwater drainage into rivers (typically, base flow of rivers), and Qin is the seepage
from rivers into aquifers. The bracketed portion of equation (1) is the overlap
representing the shared quantity of ground and surface water (since both are measured
separately and therefore by subtracting the overlap accounts for the total quantity).
Evaporation is also considered in the total estimated IRWR, especially in arid
lands where surface runoff is prevalent and therefore is accounted for by separate
measurements [26]. Several arid countries can have evaporation rates near 50 percent of
the total estimated IRWR, which significantly reduces the total renewable water resources
(TRWR). Countries with water stored in large surface areas can lose up to 100 percent of
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their IRWR, although “loss” is categorized by whether the water contributes to biomass
production [25]. Evaporation is accounted for in the data used throughout this research.
Quantifying external renewable water resources, or ERWR, accounts for more
variables than IRWR since there are social and political aspects (treaties) to consider.
ERWR is estimated using:
1
2
∗
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
+ 𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

where SWin1 is the volume of surface water entering the country, which is not submitted
to treaties, SWin2 is the volume of surface water entering the country which is secured
through treaties, SWPR is the accounted flow of border rivers, SWPL is the accounted part
of shared lakes, SWout* is the volume of surface water leaving the country which is
reserved by treaties for downstream countries, and GWin is the groundwater entering the
country. This study is focused on IRWR, particularly groundwater, considering Iran has
limited ERWR and surface water can be visually monitored whereas exact groundwater
storage and capacities are less known.
Water Security Issues
The state of water security within a country and its relation to migration and
conflict requires social, economic, political, and environmental perspectives. The World
Bank’s World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development defined
state fragility as periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or
legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state,
making them vulnerable to violence [27, p. 85]. They stress the importance of
governments and associated institutions such as nongovernment organizations (NGO) in
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determining the risks associated with fragility so as to acknowledge and avoid potential
paths to conflict. It is pertinent to recognize the dynamic nature of fragility in regards to
water security.
Fragility is linked to a number of other security issues such as social, political,
health, personal, food, energy, and environmental [28]. These issues are dependent—
when water insecurity is present, a state of fragility usually follows as one or more
insecurities prevail. Failures are not mutually exclusive within the securities. Fragility,
conflict, and violence can be the cause of these failures, and these failures can exacerbate
fragility, conflict, and violence [28]. Homer-Dixon hypothesized the interaction of
securities with sources of fragility including environmental, social, economic, population
growth, and resource distribution may interact to cause conflict [23]. He described
several examples in countries where conflict was and was not present based on that
country’s ability to adapt, but stresses more research is required.
Conflicts of any kind are rarely, if ever, attributable to single causes. As such, any
analysis or efforts at reducing the risks of conflict must consider a multitude of complex
relationships and contributing factors, including water [29]. Gleick stated that
populations have been warring over water resources for more than 4500 years, beginning
in Mesopotamia and most recently between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria [30]. Femia and
Werrell acknowledged a number of underlying causes of the Syrian civil war that erupted
in 2011, including a number of social, economic, environmental, and climatic changes
[31]. From 2006 to 2010, Syrians experienced a drought causing water shortages in more
than 60 percent of the arable cultivated land. The lead to crop and livestock failures,
ultimately resulting in millions without their livelihoods and driven to migration. Civil
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unrest began in March of 2011 in Syria, rapidly escalating into full conflict as it was
exploited by internal and external factors. This conflict is ongoing.
Research and discussion pertaining to water scarcity and security generally
mention climate change. King pointed out in an article examining water stress and
violence that climate change in Syria caused third and fourth order effects on populations,
including food security issues, which includes water scarcity [32]. Gleick explained the
effects of climate change ranging from geopolitical relations to food and water scarcity
with several prominent sources [29]. Syria is particularly prone to the effects from
climate change considering recent droughts in the early 2000’s along with poor water
usage, governmental cooperation, and continued violent conflict. Conversely, a study
performed in Iran using 79 climatological reporting station over 36 years resulted in a
lack of evidence supporting climate change [33]. The study determined there were no
appreciable increases in temperature or decreases in precipitation, but the authors did
conclude that some may be inclined to consider climate change as a cause of water
scarcity due to a decrease in precipitation during drought years [33, p. 8].
Researchers have found a lack of water security can be related to conflict, but
there are many complex interdependencies between causes that have not been studied.
Peter Gleick, president of the Pacific Institute, maintains a chronological list containing
all known water-related conflicts dating back to 3000 BC [30]. He states that while there
are binned reasons for each conflict, the study and analysis of water-related conflict is not
a “clean, precise field of study” [30]. Others posit that many experts seek a direct linkage
between water scarcity (which includes natural variability), migration (and refugee
flows), and conflict [34]. Jägerskog and Swain argued “that it is important not to draw
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hasty conclusions in terms of causal linkages in this respect” [34, p. 4]. Fluctuating
factors such as climate change, seasonal resource variability, disease outbreaks, lapses in
basic services (infrastructure), and socio-economic statuses cannot be isolated along with
water security as root causes.
Recent Examples and Potential Causes
The outcomes discussed in the previous section were held to be clearly the result
of inadequate water securities, or simply water insecurities, and a combination of other
factors. In the most recent World Bank publication on water security assessments of the
MENA region, researchers explored water security fundamentals including resource
sustainability and efficiency management, reliability and affordability of services, and
risk management of potential water-related events [1, p. xxix]. All countries in the
MENA region endure significant water scarcity. However, they have adopted strategies
in attempts to compensate for their failure to support the aforementioned fundamentals in
some form or another. The failure of the Syrian government to support water security
fundamentals serves as a comparison for a potentially similar outcome in Iran.
Syria
As previously noted, drought has been a frequently cited cause of the conflict and
subsequent internal displacement and migration within Syria since 2011. It is prudent to
mention that droughts occurred more than 50 percent of the time in the last 50 years
within Syria. But isolating drought as a primary driver of such events excludes many
social, economic, and political aspects that must be investigated. Natural resource
mismanagement occurred over long periods of time in Syria resulting in increases in
poverty, corruption, rural-urban divide, and unemployment along with decreases in state
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subsidies, agricultural and livestock production, and food exports [35, p. 521]. Several
researchers believe Basher al-Assad is to blame for the conflict in Syria since al-Assad
aimed to increase Syria’s world market appeal to the World Trade Organization by
converting the centrally planned market economy to a social market economy by cutting
subsidies to reduce the growing budget deficit [35], [36].
Culturally and politically, water is a sensitive topic in Syria since the government
focused on increasing water supply with little regard for available renewable water
resources. Government water management is divided: a hopeful modernization effort
driven by construction and irrigation and unrealistic goalsetting by corrupt, ineffective
policy makers aimed to exploit all resources [35]. Water data is unequally collected and
assessed by a number of resource managing ministries and agencies within the country
causing differences in estimates and degrading efficacy. Furthermore, corruption is fueled
by rivalries between agencies, poorly paid senior leadership, and the practice of nepotism
and clientism [35], [36].
The 2009 reduction in fuel subsidies in Syria was a way to control the overabstraction of groundwater occurring since the 1960’s. Farmers depleted groundwater
resources by running diesel pumps with subsidized, inexpensive fuel in order to increase
productivity to meet rising demands. The immediate effect of cutting fuel subsidies
shocked the agricultural workers. Without sufficient fuel, farmers either chose to use
limited funds on fuel to irrigate their crops and then were unable to transport them to
market, or abandon their land altogether [35]. As agricultural yields decreased without
subsidized fuel and fertilizer, Syria began losing their position in the global economy as
the government blamed the outcome on drought.
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The rapid rise of groundwater wells to support government-encouraged largescale irrigation for water intense crops like cotton largely occurring from the 1970s to the
late 1990s depleted several aquifer levels from 6 to 100 m. Slowly realizing the reality of
this huge over-abstraction of groundwater, the government unsuccessfully attempted to
impose licensing restriction on all illegal wells in 2005 [37]. Aquifers in the Hassakeh
governate in the northeast of Syria dried up causing migration and the Barada River in
Damascus that once fed lush gardens is now all but a trickle [38]. As of 2010, over 30
percent of Syria’s population was experiencing high or extremely high groundwater
stress, above the MENA average of 23 percent [1]. Syria’s over-abstraction of
groundwater compromises between 20 to 50 percent of environmental flow requirements,
undoubtedly due to a high (>90%) agricultural irrigation demand [1]. Syria’s once
plentiful water resources were subjected to exploitation by a growing population, overabstraction, and an economically motivated and corrupt governance first unknowingly
and subsequently with disregard to a devastatingly environmental and humanitarian
crisis, which ultimately led to war.
Coupled with the mismanagement occurring in Syria, drought still played a major
roll, especially during the 2008 growing season. Wheat production dropped 47% from
2007’s season, coinciding with the driest winter in the same year and causing a loss of
green water availability for agricultural use (Green water availability is reliant on
precipitation to replenish soil and higher amounts usually lower blue water consumption
[39]). The drought affected the majority of the agricultural community as precipitation
levels fell to 15-30 percent of annual averages [11].
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(Source: USDA)

Figure 2: Syrian Provincial Rainfall
Syria heavily relies on external surface water (72.36 percent) and over twice the
dependency of Iran on overall surface to groundwater (12.63 km3 to 6.174 km3). Syria’s
overall water consumption of total available renewable water resources rose from 19
percent in 1977 to 99 percent as of 2007 [3]. Their total internal freshwater (surface and
groundwater) withdrawals have risen from 46.8 percent in 1977 to 235 percent in 2007.
Farming populations in the northeast province of Hassakeh were most affected beginning
in 2006 and into the 2007-2008 planting season, resulting in the internal displacement of
36,000 families [40].
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(Source: UN Syria Drought Response)

Figure 3: Drought Affected Syrian Families as of 2009
Initially, impacts were estimated at 1.3 million people affected including 803,000
farmers and pastoralists (80 percent losing livelihoods subsiding on 50 percent of daily
caloric intake) [40]. According to Mohamad Alloush, director of the environment
department at the State Planning Commission (SPC), the drought forced 250,000-300,000
families (at least 1.25-1.5 million people) to leave their villages and concentrate in the
suburbs of Damascus and other cities like Aleppo and Daa’ra [41]. Fortunately, wheat
production rebounded, but continued its pre-drought decline throughout the duration of
the conflict.
Many other contributing issues stemming from water security affected Syrians.
Water supply service in Syria declined by 70 percent between 2011 and 2013 due to
conflict as dissident groups and militaries fought to control supply [42]. Decline in water
supply usually is accompanied by a decline in water quality. Water-borne diseases in
poor quality water cause increases in diarrhea related deaths, especially in children. In
Syria, these deaths accounted for 14.4 percent of all deaths of children under five years of
age, far higher than other MENA countries. Poor sanitation and hygiene become life
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threatening issues for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) as conflict and
migration continued. Other issues influenced by the status of water security in Syria
include migration and conflict, which are addressed in separate sections further in this
study.
Water Resource Metrics
A drastic loss of available water resources in a short period of time can certainly
be portrayed as a primary effect of drought, especially when other less commonly
understood causes are absent. Kumma et al. presented a methodology for water scarcity
and stress trajectories based on per capita consumption in 𝑚𝑚3 /𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 [39]. They state water
scarcity is population driven; the available resources insufficiently satisfy an increasing
large population. Water stress is a demand driven influence based on the amount used,
regardless of the population. Kummu et al. define per capita use as equations (3) and (4),
which are equivalent.
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
=
∗
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒

(3)

(4)

Within their study, Kummu et al. defined water scarcity and stress levels based on longterm decadal scale availability, consumption, and population data for the world (Table 1).
Table 1: Shortage and Stress Thresholds
Threshold
Moderate
High

Shortage (𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑 /capita/year)
1700
1000

(Source: Kumma et al.)
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Stress (Percentage of Water
Consumed)
20
40

Regionally MENA, representing 17 percent of the global population, faces both water
scarcity and stress. Syria’s land area is a ‘stress first’ archetype defined by Kummu et al.
(Table 2) as a result of demand driven per capita water use given the amount of water
available prior to a water shortage. Iran is defined by the ‘stress and shortage at same
time’ archetype, indicating per capita consumption occurred along with exceeding the
stress point (>20%). The authors define the water scarcity trajectories based on the
Falkenmark water scarcity matrix that combines stress and shortage values along per
capita consumption iso-lines in order to highlight the drivers (Figure 4 and Figure 5).
Since Syria falls into a ‘stress first’ archetype based on Table 2, the authors posit that
demand is typically prioritized before supply, resulting in increased per capita
consumption.
Table 2: Trajectory Types

(Source: Kumma et al.)
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Using (3), (4) and referenced values, calculations indicate Syria was experiencing water
scarcity and stress leading up to the civil war and subsequent migration (Table 3). This
thesis utilizes these calculated figures in scenarios modeling Syrian and Iranian water
balance.
Table 3: Estimated Stress, Shortage, and Consumption
Country

Reference

Population

Iran

Tehran
Times, 2018
FAO,
AQUASTAT
GTZ, 2007
FAO,
AQUASTAT

Syria

Water Use
(𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑 /year)

Stress

Shortage

8.02E+07

Water
Availability
(𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑 /year)
8.80E+10

9.70E+10

1.1023

1097.2569

Per Capita
Consumption,
(𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑 /capita/year)
1209.4763

7.91E+07
(2015)
1.77E+07

1.37E+11
(2014)
1.56E+10

9.33E+10
(2004)
1.92E+10

0.6810

1731.9848

1179.5196

1.2308

881.3559

1084.7458

1.85E+07
(2015)

1.68E+10
(2014)

1.68E+10
(2005)

0.9976

908.1081

905.9459

(Source: Richey et al.)

Figure 4: Falkenmark Water Scarcity Matrix
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(Source: Richey et al.)

Figure 5: Water Scarcity Trajectories
Research into measuring available groundwater has included satellite technology
rather than pure terrestrial means. Using NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Climate
Experiment (GRACE) data, Richey et al. measured the groundwater depletion rates of
major world aquifers in 2015, but none of which are within Syrian borders [43]. Voss et
al. analyzed groundwater availability using a combination of GRACE data and remote
sensors in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins and western Iran from 2003 to 2009 and
found disturbing rates of groundwater storage [44]. These data support the trend of
declining groundwater storage levels in an area encompassing portions of Turkey, Syria,
Iraq, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and western Iran along with Lake Daryace, Lake
Van, Lake Tharthar, the Asad Reservoir, and the Qadisiyah Reservoir.
With no major deep aquifer below Syria or Iran, the studies by Kummu et al. and
Voss et al. highlight aggregated global and regional quantities and consumption,
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respectively. Joodaki et al. utilized higher resolution GRACE data along with 562 active
well observations sourced from the Iran Water Resources Management Company in order
to determine monthly averages of total groundwater storage in Iran [45]. Their total
groundwater storage estimates account for naturally occurring and anthropogenic
components across most of the Middle East region and a portion of North Africa (Figure
6).

(Source: Joodaki et al.)

Figure 6: GRACE Data Coverage
Groundwater storage estimates were isolated by subtracting soil moisture, snow,
canopy storage, and river storage changes along with Caspian Sea and large lake
contributions. Joodaki et al. scaled each country estimate and applied a parametric test at
a 95 percent confidence interval before comparing GRACE coefficients with Iranian
observed well data. The authors caveat that increases in monthly storage data may be
anthropogenic considering that broad-scale irrigation is typically practiced, and that a
portion of the increases could be due to recharge from runoff and seepage [45].
Regardless of monthly groundwater storage increases, significant decreases in total
groundwater storage were observed from both GRACE coefficients and well data (Figure
7).
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(Source: Joodaki et al.)

Figure 7: Groundwater Storage Estimates
Overestimated well data may have resulted in the larger (black line) loss versus
GRACE coefficient estimates, but the authors state GRACE data did include an area
extending past the Iranian border due to a sensitivity kernel.
Iranian Issues
Madani published a paper in Iranian Studies in 2016 outlining many of the
drought-related issues affecting Iran [2]. Population growth, pollution, agricultural selfsufficiency, fuel and water subsidies, and unbalanced infrastructure have influenced
water security in Iran, but mismanagement and unsustainable usage are the major factors
in shortages. Even though Iran’s water history includes the Persian development of
qanats, 2,500-year-old underground aqueducts channeling groundwater to reservoirs for
agricultural irrigation still widely used in the region, economic growth, urban expansion,
and competition with the world trade market is unsustainably depleting water resources.
Additionally, land subsidence, deteriorating water quality, desertification, eutrophication,
and erosion are problems plaguing a country once famous for its sustainable water
practices [2].
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As Iran’s population rate of change decreases from its height during the
Revolution, the government anticipates a 1.3 percent increase to balance age distribution.
Current population in Iran is 80.2 million with a rate of change +1.14 percent (for 2016)
[46]. As shown in Figure 8, annual increase of population indicates a stabilizing trend as
the variance between high and low amplitudes decreases. Madani’s research stated the
urban population growth runs counter to the water resource locations, stressing existing
infrastructure within cities. Nearly all of the urban and three-quarters of the rural
population has access to clean water, but most consume more than twice the global
average at 250 liters per person, per day, which equates to 250 𝑙𝑙 ∗ 365 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =

91250 𝑙𝑙/𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 or 91.25 𝑚𝑚3 /𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦. This quantity represents the municipal portion of the
total water resources per capita in Table 3.
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Figure 8: Iranian Population Trends
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Total Population

Population Change

2500000

Since 92.18 percent of water in Iran is used for agricultural purposes, municipal and
industrial use is divided into 6.645 percent and 1.179 percent, respectively, which puts
the urban daily estimate in a sensible range given the variance in years.
Iran relies on oil for the majority of its GDP, although it is determined to be food
self-sufficient as are many other MENA countries due to their vulnerability to food
shortages from limited water, large populations, and political instability [2]. Virtual water
imports are a contentious topic in Iran [47], but self-sufficiency goals challenge
remaining water resources, infrastructure, and services. Water is still quite inexpensive in
Iran, as are gasoline, diesel, cooking gas, and electricity because Iran is an oil-based
economy. Efforts to cut subsidies across several five-year plans to reduce a $100 billion
program were meant to stabilize consumption and privatize services such as
transportation. Cuts in subsidies created backlash from the population, causing policy
makers to provide cash handouts to nearly everyone as an offset. Instead of boosting the
economy by convincing rural workers to seek more lucrative employment in urban
centers, rural populations remained in the country side and lived off of the government
handouts [48].
Dams offered much promise for water sustainability in Iran. At one point after the
Revolution Iran was the third largest dam builder in the world. Despite several hundred
dams built and hundreds more planned, many sit empty as watersheds and river flows
dried up due to over abstraction from irrigation and other uses. Over the decades many
environmental issues resulted from dams, including human displacement, sedimentation,
eutrophication, biodiversity damage, and downstream development, caused further issues
for governing water and energy ministries and agencies.
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The number of wells increased in the 1960s as fuel subsidies decreased fuel prices
in favor of increased production and development [1], [2]. As more wells were drilled to
meet agricultural demands, groundwater storage levels decreased and fuel consumption
rose to draw water from lower levels. The Iranian government unsuccessfully attempted
to curtail illegal well drilling, as the Syrian government attempted to do, by requiring
permits for all wells. Since water management in Iran is unable to detect and monitor
wells, the effort was changed to smart water meters, with limited success [49].
Nevertheless, the need to control a water source is paramount in a country where
droughts are common and floods can be devastating.
Interbasin water transfers are another infrastructure investment the government
has supported in order to supply urban areas such as Tehran and Zayandeh-Rud located
towards the center of Iran where resources are scarce. The process desalinates water from
renewable water sources such as the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman and pump the water
through an underground pipeline to offset dwindling urban resources. These projects are
expensive, on the order of hundreds of millions to billions of US dollars, along with
having high energy requirements. Experts question the value of such endeavors
suggesting other sustainability, service and risk-mitigating efforts for water resources
[50].
Similar to Syria, Iran’s water governance structure is mismanaged due to
insufficient support from political powers. President Ahmadinejad converted the water
management jurisdiction from watershed-based boundaries to provincial-based causing
infighting over trans-provincial water resources. Corruption is also a problem affecting
the long-term goals necessary to prevent environmental crises thus allowing irreversible
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damage to mount [2]. The population had little environmental awareness until recently
when water levels in Lake Urmia dropped due to irrigation, upstream storage from dam
and diversions, and droughts [2], [47], [51]. Public media reports regarding
environmental issues and events have improved as a result. Other water-related issues are
noteworthy. These include wastewater management, network losses (leakage rate),
pollution from nitrates and phosphates (agriculturally sourced), and water-borne diseases.
Comparison
There are many similarities concerning water resources in Syria and Iran, but
there are differences between the countries themselves. Syria is a lower economic status
than Iran, mostly due to Iran’s higher GDP [10]. This lower class led to fewer
investments in Syria. The difference in demographic transition graphs for Iran and Syria
describe the population trend and act as a potential predictor of total population [52],
[53]. In Figure 9, birth and death rates in Syria are converging such that the population is
experiencing a reduction, whereas birth and death rates of change in Iran are moving in
the same direction. Syria’s birth rate (22.158 births per 1000) is currently falling as death
rate increases (5.589 deaths per 1000), due in part to the ongoing civil war. These rate
variations are an indication of a slowly decreasing or potentially slowly increasing total
population. However, the birth and death rates prior to the beginning of the civil war in
2009 were trending at a similar rate 27.139 and 3.798, respectively. The population of
Iran is over three times that of Syria, but the birth and death rates have remained more
synchronized following the Revolution, which may be indicative of other socio-economic
factors.
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Figure 9: Syrian and Iranian Demographic Transition Graphs
The recent civil war and mass migration have left many services unfilled, setting behind
on any future developments, maintenance, and repairs of the infrastructure. Iran has a
much larger population than Syria (80.2 million to 18.3 million) and landmass (636,400
mi² to 71,498 mi²) requiring more infrastructure and governance. Focusing on the water
security leads this study towards water availability and consumption by a growing
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population. Using the example of Syria’s water security failures as a potential outcome
for Iran’s current course highlights the importance of investigating models linking Syria’s
outcomes onto Iran.
Models
The available research has and continues to stress the importance and critical
requirement to address water security, yet a methodology to model its interaction with
influencers is absent. Many researchers understand that water security involves
monitoring more than surface, ground, and transboundary water sources [23], [29], [34].
Currently, scientific models of linkages between water securities, migration, and conflict
are unavailable. Hydrological models of the world such as WaterGAP provide the UN
and other international assessors do exist with freshwater flow and storages statistics. The
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN maintains AQUASTAT, a
collection of analyzed water resource, use, and agricultural management data for all
countries [3]. The World Bank has an extensive database of fragility and conflict metaand micro-data for numerous countries [54]. The aforementioned resources possess
potentially applicable models for water security analysis, particularly Simonovic’s
WorldWater model and Zarghami’s Tabriz Systems Dynamics model [4], [51].
Migration
The International Organization of Migration (IOM), the UN migration agency,
defined migration as
The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international
border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of
movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes
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migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving
for other purposes, including family reunification [55].
The number of migrants in 2017, including refugees and internally displaced
persons, topped 258 million, or three percent of the world’s population [56]. According to
the World Bank’s 2016 Migration and Remittance Report, migrant numbers have risen in
recent years due to job opportunities, labor shortages resulting from falling birth rates,
internal conflict and war, natural disasters, climate change, and improved access to
information through phone and the Internet [46].
While there are many apparent causes of migration, there are also a variety of
theories postulating its drivers. Beginning with Ernst Georg Ravenstein’s seminal work in
the 1880’s, migration theories progressed throughout the 20th century through works by
Greenwood, Graves, and Lee. As a demographer, Lee provided a framework to describe
migration volume, streams and counter streams, along with the characteristics of migrants
[57]. He simply stated that migrants permanently or non-permanently move from one
location to another. Those moves are characterized by attractiveness measured in ‘pluses
and ‘minuses’ at the origin and destination separated by varying degrees of intervening
obstacles. These moves occur on more broadly defined ‘push-pull’ networks between two
or more locations, including transit locations between an origin and a destination.
Migrants consider both rational and irrational reasons for moving from an unattractive
origin to a perceived more attractive destination.
The resulting volume of migrants causes streams and counter streams to and from
the destination and origin, respectively. Positive and negative characteristics influence
migration; migrants with higher intelligence or more education typically make rational
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and positive decisions based on their assessment of pluses at the destination. Positively
inclined migrants can maneuver through and overcome the intervening obstacles in the
migration process. The opposite is true for those migrants negatively associated with the
minuses in the origin. Lee provided a similar conclusion by stating that incorporating
personal characteristics of migrants in the form of micro-data may be influential towards
advancing empirical research in migration including dynamic models of migratory
behavior using time-series data [57, p. 541].
While micro-data is unavailable for one of the more major and recent migrations
caused by water scarcity in Syria, exploring the larger drivers is necessary. Syria
experienced a significant drought from 2004-2011 that resulted in the unemployment and
eventual migration of 1.5 million people from rural agriculture populations into the urban
areas. Although Syrians endured a civil war with a government capable of supplying 50
percent of them access to clean water, the infrastructure and supply were being
weaponized by Islamic State (IS) terrorists in attempts to incentivize recruitment and
control. Other catalysts fired the migration and reinforced the subsequent civil war. Water
scarcity forced farmers and herders from their homes in the country side into the cities
and urban areas looking for better livelihoods and resources. But the cities were already
taxed beyond capacity in terms of water, which placed demands on the government to
deliver increased water supply and other resources. Keep in mind that Syria’s population
had experienced major growth—from 3 million in 1950 to 22 million in 2012. The
reformed government failed to provide additional water supply, which preceded violent
uprisings against the government. The primary demand of those leading many uprisings
was not for reform but for water [58, p. 14].
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Edwards offered a more in-depth analysis of migrant behavior in attempts to
model the complexities of forced migration, particularly the reasoning behind why micro
and macro level inputs, along with push-pull and migratory networks insufficiently
explain the subject [16]. With extensive support for his analysis, he stated there are two
primary types of migrants: those who move for economic reasons and those who are
forced to migrate due to other reasons. Other studies have emulated these results [59]–
[61] . Typically, forced migration is said to be the result of some crisis or combination of
crises whereas voluntary migration is by choice and is therefore rationalized by the
decision maker. Edwards focused on what is lost to many migration and refugee flow
studies; the choices of those migrants within the migration framework. While there is
merit to the push-pull methodology as it links the micro (individual) and macro
(structural inputs) level causes, studies and research largely omit the meso (social) level
that Edwards investigated [16].
Refugees experiencing forced migration are subject to social drivers unlike those
in voluntary or economic migrants. Drivers are usually apparent or reported by voluntary
migrants in a push-pull model whereas the drivers in a forced migration are far more
obscure. Refugees are driven by complexities and variances in their environment,
especially those social networks that determine migratory networks that must be
acknowledged before becoming a crisis. Edwards pointed out that the UNHCR identifies
potential signs of migration that include ethnic, racial, social, or religious tensions,
human rights violations, opposing political movements, faulty relationships with
neighboring countries, demographics, environmental issues, economic instability, drug
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trafficking and historical evidence within their contingency planning guidelines for their
field staff [16, p. 22].
Over time, studies have accumulated on the drivers of different forms of
migration. Violence, especially armed conflict sponsored by government militaries
causes displacement (IDPs) and refugee outflow [59], [60]. States not protecting the
human rights of their population cause more refugees [62]. Poverty stricken populations
as a result of economic depravation increase displacement as well [60], [63]. These
drivers have been postulated in studies of early warning models of potential humanitarian
disasters resulting in migration [64]. Migratory causes are extensive but nevertheless
include a population’s dependency on resources, and when water becomes scarce, people
will relocate. Water security and water scarcity are both integrated into migration in
many direct and indirect aspects. Data sets originating from experiments, observations
over time, and modeled simulations vary in terms of density and fidelity. These facts
support the primary issue of water scarcity in this study.
Conflict
There are a range of definitions for conflict applicable to the topic at hand. From a
civilian perspective, Maurer defined conflict as a “disagreement resulting from
incompatible demands between or among two or more parties [65, p. 1].” NATO defined
the term as a
political-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by
the introduction of organized political violence and from war by its reliance on
political methods. It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including
the destruction of governments and the control of territory [66].
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Interestingly, the US Department of Defense official dictionary [67] had no definition for
conflict, but offered supporting terminology of a similar context. They defined the term
engagement as “a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver
forces [67].” The DoD officially defines conflict prevention as a
peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when
necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the cause of conflict, and take
timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities
[67].”
References to conflict within DoD joint publications usually accompanied the term
“armed” or “continuum.” Conflict continuum is a “measure of military instrument of
national power applied between the states of peace and war [68, p. 119].” The definitions
vary based on political, organizational, and individual involvement along with the level
and intensity of violence occurring. With respect to this research, the more important
aspect of conflict are the causes.
Stewart [17] presented cultural and economic drivers to wars and conflict that
include ethnic, religious, economic, and social causes. The author briefly described four
interrelated economic hypotheses supported by evidence from analyses of countries
exhibiting conflict or war. Economics plays a fundamental rather than supplementary role
in each hypothesis. In the first, the author states groups may exhibit cultural or religious
differences, but conflict is not realized until political or economic power is imbalanced
[17]. The second hypothesis states that personal gain is realized during war and conflict
when largely uneducated young men become attracted to more lucrative opportunities,
regardless of the morality, when socially accepted employment options are minimal or
nonexistent. In the third hypothesis, when the unwritten socially acceptable balance

42

between a population and the government fails, it is typically due to the populations lack
of faith in the government’s commitment to provide basic needs. Finally, when the
environment ceases to sustain the population, such as a water scarcity, the population
suffers. A particular resource scarcity may be caused by a lack of governance or policy in
management, sustainability, disaster preparedness and response, and infrastructure.
The hypotheses presented by Stewart are supported by evidence in the form of
analyses and studies across numerous populations. Group inequality occurs within a
population in the form of horizontal inequalities, which when they become widespread
and persist, can cause a range of conflict from protests to rebellions. When groups are
unable or unwilling to consider peaceful negotiations, especially if their government has
failed to address inequalities, conflict can occur. Horizontal inequalities occur when
groups, not individuals, share common identities but differ in social, economic, political,
and cultural statuses and is largely measured in terms of income or consumption [18].
One study supports the theory that personal gain in the form of greed outweighs
grievance between a populace and their governments although the methodologies of the
study are contentious [69].
Other evidence regarding econometrics and environments indicated significant
variances. These variances existed when per capita incomes, life expectancy, and
economic growth figures were analyzed when determining vertical separation and
conflict. Countries vulnerable to conflict typically do not receive support from outside
funding, especially when their governments are failing. In terms of environments,
particularly resources, there are disparities between scarcity and abundance. Scarcity
tends to cause conflict from the populace given inadequate resources whereas abundance
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is fortuitous to groups willing and able to seize control. As mentioned, these hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive, and result in horizontal inequalities driving conflict such as
those listed in Table 4. Causes of conflict presented by Stewart [17] require further
investigation of horizontal inequalities in countries where populations are suffering from
imbalanced governments and unfair policies that favor particular groups, empower
corruption, devalue education, and misuse resources.
Table 4: Horizontal Inequality (HI) Examples

(Source: Stewart)

One of the primary underlying drivers to the majority of conflict is a propensity
for conflict within a country’s history. Østby’s empirical and spatial analysis across SubSaharan African countries, for 1986–2003, reveals a significant rise in the probability of
conflict in countries with severe economic and social HIs [70]. Specifically, these HIs
include low educational levels along with high levels of intra-regional socioeconomic
inequalities influence higher levels of conflict [70]. Østby cites that abundant natural
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resources cause conflict due to deprivation levels. Other statistical research supporting
this relationship includes relative deprivation and conflict in Sub-Saharan African
countries in the 1960s [71], [72]. Data from 1946–2005 for the world indicates that
countries exhibiting political exclusion of populations experience more violence [73].
Countries with high value natural resources are potentially susceptible to conflict,
especially when the level of scarcity changes drastically [18]. Across groups of people,
unbalanced quantities or access create opportunities for powerful groups to control a
perceived inferior group. While Stewart cites oil and diamonds as valuable natural
resource, water has the potential to incite significant HIs if an abundant water resource
falls under the control of a corrupt or violent group. Governments have the ability to
enact policy limiting resource infrastructure to poorer or impoverished populations in
efforts to reform or force them to migrate.
O’Brien presented a fuzzy algorithm application approach to forecasting conflict
using social, economic, and political variables such as GDP per capita, number of civil
liberties, and ratio of young-to-old [74]. His results indicated an 80 percent success of
predicting conflict from data used to categorically rank conflicts. O’Brien recommended
a collaborative social science experiment where a repository of interdisciplinary efforts
could be submitted, recorded, incorporated, and analyzed [75]. This large-scale project
aimed to aggregate social, economic, political, cultural, and military drivers of conflict
based on the extensive studies and research of past and present in order to increase the
collective knowledge for future conflict research.
There are significantly more studies and research about conflict than water
security and migration. The key aspect of the reviewed literature is that water as a natural
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resource with the potential to influence conflict. People intuitively seek out water as a
necessity for life, and in water scarce and insecure countries many often migrate to do so.
Yet as the literature has suggested, engaging in conflict over water resources may be a
choice motivated by one or several known or unknown contributing drivers. As with
migration, exploring the causes of conflict is necessary towards understanding the
potential influence water resources can exercise.
System Dynamics
System dynamics is a methodology applicable to modeling factors of a
convoluted system of interdependent factors such as the one presented in this thesis. Jay
Forrester developed system dynamics following his work with management at General
Electric and with radar systems for the US Navy. He blended the complexities of social
systems with physical systems at the recently established School of Management at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT [76]. Forrester describes systems as “a
grouping of parts that operate together for a common purpose” [77]. The DoD operates
in a hierarchical manner with information and knowledge controlled by classification and
necessity. Relatedly, Forrester informs that “without an organizing structure, knowledge
is a mere collection of observations, practices and conflicting incidents” [77]. To arrive
at solutions for strategic and operational planning efforts, systems that define the
intricacies and relationships within the operational environment are necessary.
System dynamics, stated simply, attempts to model the interdependent elements
within a system in order to understand its behavior over time [4], [5], [78]. That behavior
is characterized by the complexity of the system’s elements, and the accuracy of the
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behavior is dependent on proper system modeling. A system dynamics model is
comprised of causal loops identifying the feedback of interactions between elements of a
system. These causal loops are typically converted to ‘stocks’ and ‘flows’. Stocks
represent an element with a capacity that can change over time whereas a flow is the rate
at which a stock can change. Stock and flow diagrams display the interactions between
elements in the system so information can be traced throughout. Linear and/or continuous
equations in time are applied to the system flows before initializing the system with
appropriate stock levels based on expert input, previous research, or analyses [79].
The dynamic nature of an operational environment demands the analysis and
planning to which the DoD currently subscribes in addition to a number of system
dynamics methods introduced over the last fifty years. An operational environment is a
complex system to model. Forrester progressed his work in system dynamics by
publishing a provocative urban model highlighting the negative effects of inner city
housing projects [76], [80]. He continued his non-corporate work on the WORLD models
after an invitation to the Club of Rome led to development of a world socioeconomic
model [81].
Forrester continued refining and applying system dynamics methodologies to the
US economy and education while other researchers developed models for other
applications. These included energy and in particular, gas, coal, oil, and electricity
utilities [76]. More pertinent to the research supporting this thesis, system dynamics has
been applied to hydrology and water scarcity issues in particular regions of the world.
Elshorbagy described methodologies for teaching watershed hydrology, which is a
natural renewable water source where precipitation and snow melt is collected and
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channeled on or in the ground towards an outlet [5, p. 1203]. The watershed models
created by Elshorbagy are one application of system dynamics applicable to this research.
Other than watersheds, system dynamics models approximating world parameters have
notable applicability. Kojiri, Hori, Nakatsuka, and Chong assessed future water scarcity
on population growth for each continent using six societal sectors [6]. These sectors
included population (birth, maturation and death), agriculture (land development, land
fertility, food production); capital (industrial and service outputs), nonrenewable
resources (resources use and extraction), persistent pollution (pollution emission and
assimilation) and water (water quality and water quantity) interacting with migration,
trade of food, nonrenewable resources and industrial outputs, and foreign investments of
services [6].
Simonovic produced a similar model, WorldWater, using the existing World3
model. The World3 model is dynamic versus many other water resource models (Table 5)
whose applicability to world development Simonovic felt was limited [4, p. 250].
Table 5: Water Models
Available Water Models
Policy Dialogue Model (PODIUM)
International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural
Commodities and Trade (IMPACT)
POLESTAR
Water Evaluation and Planning System (WEAP)
Water Global Assessment and Prognosis (WATERGAP)
Tool to Assess Regional and Global Environment and health
Targets for Sustainability (TARGETS)
(Source: Simonovic)

Simonovic concludes that developing regional models of the WorldWater model would
be far more effective in understanding dynamic regional water issues rather than
attempting to convey water issues from a global standpoint. In a working paper on the
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topic of global water by Gassert, Landis, Luck, Reig, and Shiao, hydrological information
is presented through a composite index approach [82]. Gassert et al. attempted to enable
decision makers with water related risk indicators across the world, but cautioned this
type of methodology was not advised for site or regional applications. These are
important aspects for the research in this thesis since determining the affect water scarcity
has on a local rather than global population towards migration or conflict is far more
specific.
System dynamics is an ideal methodology to be applied to a dynamic environment
with a multitude of potentially applicable dependent and independent variables. This
overview of literature concerning system dynamics and pertinent research enables this
study to model select water security variables with the intent of investigating the
influence on migration and conflict.
Model Validation
Generally, modelers understand that their models are an abstraction of the truth,
but that their perspective ultimately fails to address the truth entirely. The usefulness of a
model is largely dependent on the modeler’s ability to convey the practicality in its
purpose whether that is to highlight previously accepted assumptions, challenge
preconceived notions, or solicit input from varying disciplines. Forrester defined
validation as
a process of establishing confidence in the soundness and usefulness of a
model…beginning as the model builder accumulates confidence that a model
behaves plausibly and generates problem symptoms or modes of behavior seen in
the real system [83, p. 210].
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Sterman recited the fundamental definitions of verification and validation as examples of
the fact that it is impossible to truly prove a model’s worth since it is wrong [79, p. 846].
Zagonel consolidated validation and verification processes for both Forrester and Senge,
and Sterman into five components each with ranked tests that avoid a “check-list”
structure such that is commensurate with the modeling effort itself (Table 6).
Table 6: Five Components of Modeling Practice

(Source: Zagonel)

Considering this study, our validation and verification efforts begin with mapping
the topics of interest: water security, migration, and conflict. The narrative described
within this chapter has led us towards a qualitative relationship between the variables to
be investigated in our model. These social and environmental parameters include
population (birth rate, death rate, and migration rate) and water balance (total internal and
external renewable water resources, current per capita water consumption, water demand,
and estimated change in migration rate). This study performs quantitative modeling using
Vensim ® DSS [84], which permits stock and flow diagram formulation and simulation.
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Our study proposes four questions for investigation:
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas?
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify a particular country’s water
security?
3. Does the amount of available renewable water resources per capita serve as a
trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within a country?
The third question is supported by the modeling and simulation efforts in Vensim while
the remaining questions are based on qualitative deduction. The dynamics between
parameters in the model is investigated over time through simulation. The simulations are
varied by exercising the limits of particular parameters in order to determine their
sensitivity. Finally simulation enables prediction across the model parameters in order to
demonstrate behavior. Within the next chapter of this study, the validation processes are
specifically defined.
Summary
The literature on relationships between water security, migration, and conflict
humbly spans decades. While system dynamics has the most recent genesis in the mid20th century by Forrester, migration research has its roots within the 19th century by the
early work of Ravenstein. Even more incredible is that water security has been directly
and indirectly strategized for several millennia by powers who have risen and fallen. The
literature reviewed in this chapter supports the preceding investigation of drivers of water
security and migration.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the model building process, including the course of action
required to define the causal relationships between water security and migration. Data
required to parameterize the stock and flow system dynamic model is identified. Several
verification and validation processes are executed in order to ensure sufficient accuracy
for the simulation. A design of experiments is created and implemented to identify the
extent of the drivers (parameters). Several scenarios are executed in Chapter 4 to
investigate the overall influence of the drivers in Iran.
Model Purpose
As previously discussed, there are several narratives claiming that interdependent
social, economic, political, and environmental factors drive water scarcity, migration, and
conflict. The model defined in this chapter focuses on the total per capita renewable
water resource availability, and the migration rate of change to address the following
questions:
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas?
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify Iran’s water security?
3. Does the amount of per capita renewable water resources available serve as a
trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within Iran?
The first question is rhetorical, since we have identified total per capita renewable water
resource consumption and availability (TRWR-C and TRWR-A, respectively), and the
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migration rate of change as potential drivers. It is important to investigate the relationship
between TRWR-A and migration, since they are separate observations with various data
sources. Finally, investigating TRWR-A may or may not indicate a difference between
actual or perceived influence, or whether it is a direct or indirect driver of migration.
Data Requirements
Many data sources were reviewed for possible application as social, economic,
political, and environmental drivers. Those database sources considered for inclusion
included: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) AQUASTAT website [3],
World Development Indicators from the World Bank DataBank website [85], the US
Census Bureau, International Division [86], and the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees [87]. Several other water resource data sources referencing AQUASTAT data
were excluded due to lack of value added from the aforementioned data sources.
It is noteworthy that the aggregated AQUASTAT data utilized for this study,
particularly the TRWR-A is based on long-term averages of known internal and external
sources. The AQUASTAT database was aggregated by country, rather than by region.
All TRWR-A observations occurred every five years beginning in 1962 and ending in
2014. Consequently, if the observation data was unchanged throughout the range, those
calculated data utilized the long-term average. This fact is problematic since other
sources cite different annual water resource observations from regional municipal,
industrial, or agricultural sources. However, no available regional sources possessed
time-series data covering the period AQUASTAT offered. The World Development
Indicators database offered on the World Bank DataBank website contained several
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observation series from the AQUASTAT database. The World Bank database was
queried by country along with 1,574 estimated ‘indicators’ relevant to global, national,
and regional development [85]. The input parameters and model variables and
corresponding data sources are listed in Table 7. Migration and death figures are not
delineated by cause and are assumed to encompass all causes including water scarcity
and conflict-related deaths.
There were other studies regarding drivers and causes water scarcity and
insecurity available that were also considered as data sources. As previously mentioned,
GRACE and observed Iranian well level data analyzed by Joodaki et al. resulted in
significant decreases in groundwater storage due to both climate and anthropogenic
influence [44], [45]. Rainfall, drought, and agricultural studies offered total renewable
water resource data as well [33], [88], [89]. Observations direct from Iranian water
resource managers was publicly available, but access restricted offered the best potential
water resource and consumption data [45]. News outlets offered sparse estimated annual
water resource levels and consumption rates from independent and government sources
[41], [50], [90], [91]. The reputation of the UN and the vast number of citations for other
water scarcity and security researchers solidified the decision to utilize AQUASTAT
estimates in this thesis. The case for migration rates and data was taken in the same
regard. More independent researchers, aid organizations, and governments referenced the
UN Refugee database than any other source. Of course, as better data sources become
available, they can be utilized.
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Model Construction
The causal model and stock and flow diagram developed for this study is an
adaptation Simonovic’s WorldWater (Figure 10) model along with s-shaped limits to
growth feedback systems found in several texts [77], [79], [81], [92]. The primary focus
is population, since total renewable water resources per capita (TRWR-P) is the quotient
of TRWR-A and population. The causal loop diagram in Figure 11 denotes this focus.
Population has a positive influence on consumption, which has a negative influence on
water resources.

(Source: Simonovic, 2002 p. 256)

Figure 10: WorldWater Model

Since water resources are the limit to growth in this model, they negatively influence
population as they decrease, thus positively influencing migration (emigration).
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Migration is typically denoted as net migration, which is the net change of migration
from both emigration and immigration. We are concerned with emigration due to the
historically observed examples of populations migrating towards abundant resources or
away from areas lacking resources.

Figure 11: Causal Loop Diagram of Model
There are many parameters and variables influencing population. The parameters
and variables used in this study’s model are described in Table 7. The exogenous
parameters we utilized in the model include average lifetime (years), birth, death, and net
migration rates (approximated as number per 1000 people), and the initial population.
Specific to modeling limits to growth models, a carrying capacity is introduced to balance
the reinforcing growth loop from births through migration and deaths. The carrying
capacity is defined as the quotient of TRWR-A divided by the TRWR-P (above 95
percent consumed, TRWR-C/TRWR-A) giving a population (persons).
We hypothesize migration and death rates of change increase as TRWR-P
decreases. These rates of change are modeled through both UN FAO AQUASTAT and
56

US Census Bureau migration and birth rate data beginning from the point in time (years)
when TRWR-C is 95 percent or greater than TRWR-A. In the case of Syria, TRWR-C
was over 95 percent of TRWR-A in the year 2001 according to UN FAO AQUASTAT
estimates [3]. Migration and death rates are modeled and parameterized as lookup tables
with percentages of normalized population (population divided by carrying capacity) as
input and the gross migration and death rates as outputs. Lookup table outputs are input
as a multiplier of the normal migration and death rates, respectively. Migration and death
rates are integrated over time along with the population as feedback. Since the effects of
TRWR-P are not instantaneous on a population, migration and death rates have
exponential smoothing factors with corresponding delays (years). Delays are varied
depending on the model’s response (population level, in persons). The UN World
Population Prospects 2017 projected that 40 per cent of Syrian refugees return in 20202025, 30 per cent in 2025-2030 and 10 per cent in 2030-2035 [93].

Figure 12: Model
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Table 7: Model Parameters and Variables
Parameter /
Variable
Population

Description

Data Source

Number of persons given births, deaths, and
emigrants over time (persons)
Number of persons at simulation start time (year)

WDI, US Census

Input /
Model
Model

WDI, US Census

Input

Quotient of TRWR-A and TRWR-P (at 95%
consumption of TRWR-A) (persons)
Fraction of Population and Carrying Capacity
(percent)
Quantity of births (person)

AQUASTAT

Input

-

Input

-

Model

WDI, US Census

Input

Average Lifetime

Fraction of births occurring per 1000 persons per
year (fraction / year)
Life expectancy at birth (years)

WDI, US Census

Input

Deaths

Quantity of deaths (person)

-

Model

Normal Death Rate

Fraction of deaths occurring per 1000 persons per
year (fraction / year)
Product of Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths
Function and Normalized Population
(Dimensionless)
Parameter of exponential delay (years)

WDI, US Census

Input

-

Model

WDI, US Census

Model

Table of inputs of Normalized Population
corresponding to crude deaths (Dimensionless)
Product of Normal migration rate and Effect of
TRWR-P on migration
Product of Emigrants and Population (persons)

WDI, US Census

Input

WDI, US Census

Model

WDI, US Census

Model

Product of Effect of TRWR-P on Migration
Function and Normalized Population
(Dimensionless)
Parameter of exponential delay (years)

-

Model

WDI, US Census

Input

Table of inputs of Normalized Population
corresponding to crude migration
(Dimensionless)
Fraction of emigrants per 1000 persons per year
(fraction / year)

WDI, US Census

Input

WDI, US Census

Input

Initial Population
Carrying Capacity
Normalized
Population
Births
Birth Rate

Effect of TRWR-P
on Deaths
Effect Delay on
Deaths
Effect of TRWR-P
on Deaths Function
Migration
Normal Migration
Rate
Effect of TRWR-P
on Migration
Effect Delay on
Migration
Effect of TRWR-P
on Migration
Function
Emigration Rate

Training Model Initialization
The model is initialized using Syria data as the training set in order to determine
performance, verify, and validate the model for the test set (Iran). All initialization data is
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sourced from US Census Bureau, UN FAO AQUASTAT. Simulation time begins in the
year 2001 and ends in 2025, with recorded Syrian population, migration, births, and
deaths from 2001 to present, and forecasted data from 2018 to 2025. Initialization values
are defined in Table 8.
Table 8: Syria Model Initialization Values
Parameter

Description

Starting Value (Year)

Initial Population

Number of persons at simulation start time (year)

16.93 million (2001)

Carrying Capacity

Quotient of TRWR-A and TRWR-P:
(16.8 billion cu. meters / 825 cu. Meters)
Fraction of births occurring per 1000 persons per
year (fraction / year)
Life expectancy at birth (years)

20.63 million

Fraction of deaths occurring per 1000 persons per
year (fraction / year)
Parameter of exponential delay (years)

4

Table of inputs of Normalized Population
corresponding to crude deaths (Dimensionless)

(1,0), (1.01,47),
(1.02,147), (1.03,114),
(1.04,20), (1.05,1)
0.1

Birth Rate
Average Lifetime
Normal Death Rate
Effect Delay on
Deaths
Effect of TRWR-P
on Deaths Function
Emigration Rate
Effect Delay on
Migration
Effect of TRWR-P
on Migration
Function

Fraction of emigrants per 1000 persons per year
(fraction / year)
Parameter of exponential delay (years)
Table of inputs of Normalized Population
corresponding to crude migration (Dimensionless)

30 (2001)
72

2.7

2.1
(1,0), (1.01,1.15),
(1.02,1.3), (1.03,1.45),
(1.04,1.6), (1.05,1.75)

Model Verification
Recognizing that system dynamics models behave differently than discrete event
simulation, Sterman stated that both model verification and validation of a system
dynamics model are impossible based on existing traditional definitions of the terms [79,
p. 846]. This statement is meant to enable thorough and robust model building rather than
dissuade modelers from even attempting to produce a realistic perspective. The purpose
of the model in this study is to investigate the applicability of TRWR-P as a driver of
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migration and/or conflict within a country. Model verification is implemented by
inputting Syrian migration, birth, death, and TRWR-P data and comparing the model’s
output to Syrian population over the same time period. The model is validated using
several of Forrester and Senge’s validation tests adapted and redefined by Zagonel [83],
[94].
The US Census Bureau provided Syrian migration rate using UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data from 2001 through 2013 and estimated data
through 2025 (Figure 13). The simulation begins at 2001 since net migration prior to that
year had a mean of -1.05 (1981-2000), which implies an approximately steady state rate.
2001 is also the period of time when TRWR-C rose above 95 percent of TRWR-A.
Including migration data from 2001 to 2005 prior to the beginning of the drought in 2004
enables simulation and visualization of a steady state migration preceding the significant
decrease through 2013.

Syrian Net Migration Rate
50
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100

Year

Figure 13: US Census Bureau Migration Data for Syria
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Using estimated migration data following 2013 enables the simulation of a stabilizing
population following the significant migration. Immigration rates occurring from 20052007 are omitted in the simulation due to the fact that sources defining the cause were
unavailable. The migration rates were included as outputs of the lookup function Effect
of TRWR-P on Migration Function with the Normalized Population values as inputs. The
window of migration rates are reduced from 2006-2013 to 2012-2015 to prevent the
effect on exponential delay in the migration rate and influencing the population level. The
Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths Function is established with a simpler ramp function in
order to replicate the change in death rates from 4 to 7 per 1000 from 2011-2012. Death
rates provided by the World Bank sourced from UN World Population Prospects were
estimated to the nearest thousandth, and were used in the Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths
Function along with the Normalized Population values as inputs.
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(Source: Ventana)

Figure 14: Effects of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions
Using standard least squares regression, the simulated model fit the actual population
2
data (2001-2016) with a 𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.94 with a 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
= 0.93 indicating 94 percent of the

variability in the strength is accounted for by the model (Figure 15, Figure 16). Adding
the additional estimated data (2017-2025) from the US Census Bureau to the model
2
results in a 𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.42 with a 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
= 0.40 (Figure 17, Figure 18). The addition of the

estimated US Census Bureau data (2017-2025) reduced the strength of the model

according to standard least squares regression. However, the model displays a strong
variability for actual Syrian population data providing a starting point from which to
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predict population changes based on net migration, birth, and death rates. In addition,
while the 𝑅𝑅 2 = 0.42 would not be considered high for engineering data, it is respectable
for behavioral data.

Verification: Actual to Simulated
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Figure 15: Model Verification of Population

Figure 16: Predicted Fit of Simulated to Actual Population Data
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Verification: Actual (with est.) to Simulated
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Figure 17: Model Verification of Population (with est. data)

Figure 18: Predicted Fit of Simulated to Actual Population Data (with est. data)
Model Validation
Five tests adapted by Zagonel’s reorganization of Forrester and Senge’s validation
tests provided in Appendix A are performed [83], [94]. The tests cover three of the five
components including quantitative, hypothesis, and uncertainty. These tests are selected
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due to their ‘basic’ categorization within the five component organization and their
applicability on the simplistic design of the model.
The first test determines physical conservation—does the model adhere to realworld conditions in Syria? The model outputs population levels by simulating actual rate
data retrieved from credible sources (UN, World Bank) with methodologies
commensurate with accepted population definitions [10], [12], [87]. The second test
determines the dimensional consistency within the model—are all parameters, variables,
levels, and rates realistic for Syria? All dimensions are appropriately and accurately
applied within the model. The dimensionless parameters in the model are fractions of
known dimensions and do not inappropriately dimension other parameters or variables.
The third test determines the qualitative behavior—does the model simulate the realworld response? The model demonstrates expected behavior determined by the
availability of actual population data. However, the model does not respond in an
expected manner with estimated data, particularly US Census Bureau population from
2017-2025. The lack of actual census data, variability of water security and conflict in the
modeled country (Syria), and unknown outcome of current events in the modeled country
limit modeling accuracy for future time periods.
The fourth test determines whether TRWR-P is endogenous—does limiting the
population drive migration based on TRWR-P levels? Normalizing the population in
order to affect the migration and death rates is accurately represented by the simulated
response and verified through standard least squares regression. The fifth test determines
the model sensitivity—do values change significantly when parameters are varied over
plausible ranges? Dimensionless parameters represent observed rates of change and
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therefore are not included in this test. The model appears sensitive to migration, birth,
and death rates. The five tests offer validity to the model in this study based on the
complexity, application, and available parameters.
Model Demonstration
The proposed model and parameters appear to realistically represent what
occurred in Syria adding credibility to the overall framework. The model is exercised
through a demonstration in order to determine if the observed differences in the factors
are due to changes only and if the observed differences are statistically significant [95].
The factors in the demonstration include levels of the Effect Delay on Migration, Effect
Delay on Deaths parameters, and Carrying Capacity (correlated to TRWR-P). The
treatment levels are defined in Table 9.
Table 9: Treatment Levels
Factor
Effect Delay on Migration
Effect Delay on Deaths
Carrying Capacity

Level
1-10 years
1-10 years
72.20 – 91.10 million

As of 2007, the Iranian population was 72,203,000 people, with a TRWR-A of
137 billion cubic meters (TRWR-P of 1910 m3/person/year), and a consumption of 68.1
percent (TRWR-C of 1301 m3/person/year). The consumption rate of change increased an
average of 3.76 percent from 1997 to 2007. A level of 95 percent consumption of
TRWR-A is reached in the year 2047 by extrapolating the consumption rate of change.
The population in the year 2047 is estimated to be 85,694,055 by extrapolating the 2014
population using the proposed 1.3 percent annual growth rate. In the year 2047, Iranian
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TRWR-P is an estimated 1582 m3/person/year. Simulation of the model with Iranian data
begins in the year 2007, since this marks the last available observed consumption of
TRWR-A data. The Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths Function and Effect of TRWR-P on
Migration Function are maintained from the Syrian model and Effect Delays on
Migration and Deaths are initialized at 1 year. The range of delay is selected based on
assumed ranges of response time to both water scarcity and conflict as well as the
limitations of the exponential delay function within the software. Delay values below 1
resulted in oscillation of all variables, thus a lower bound of 1 was established. Model
initialization values for Iran are located in Table 11. The model is also simulated at
optimal Effect Delay on Migration and Effect Delay on Deaths for Syria with Carrying
Capacity at 86.6 million people. Finally, the model is optimized using Vensim software.
Simulation occurs over the 2007-2032 time period in order to maintain the same time
period as the Syrian simulation, but adjusted to the right in order to capture the most
recent TRWR-C value (2007). Simulation scenarios are listed in Table 10.
Model Tuning
The model is “optimized” using the Vensim Optimizer function by weighting the
specified factor as the highest priority and tuning the remaining model parameters
(factors) in Table 9. Tuning in the Vensim software maximizes the prioritized factor
across the simulation period. The payoff value for tuning is population and migration;
maximizing these factors across the period of simulation minimizes the balancing and
reinforcing feedback endogenous to the model.

67

Summary
In this chapter, we developed a population simulation model using Syrian
parameters and variables. The data required to simulate the model were identified,
interpolated, and extrapolated only when necessary to satisfy simulation periods over
estimated population responses. Using actual and estimated Syrian data, we verified the
simulation model using standard regression techniques. The simulation model was
validated through several known tests in an effort to most accurately represent population
growth. A demonstration was designed to test the effects of various treatments on specific
factors through four scenarios. Finally the scenarios were executed as a method to
determine if the Iranian population (response) will follow the Syrian population given the
same effects on migration and death functions and delays.
Table 10: Simulation Scenarios.
Scenario
Baseline
Syria
Vensim Opt.
Population
Vensim Opt.
Migration

Effect Delay on
Migration
1
2.1

Effect Delay on
Deaths
1
2.7

Carrying
Capacity
86.6 million
86.6 million

?

?

?

?

?

?
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Table 11: Iranian Initialization Values
Parameter

Description

Starting Value (Year)

Initial Population

Number of persons at simulation start time (year)

72.20 million (2007)

Carrying Capacity

Quotient of TRWR-A and TRWR-P:
(137 billion cu. meters / 1582 cu. Meters)
Fraction of births occurring per 1000 persons per
year (fraction / year)
Life expectancy at birth (years)

86.60 million (est.
2047)
18

Fraction of deaths occurring per 1000 persons per
year (fraction / year)
Parameter of exponential delay (years)

5

Table of inputs of Normalized Population
corresponding to crude deaths (Dimensionless)

(1,0), (1.01,47),
(1.02,147), (1.03,114),
(1.04,20), (1.05,1)
1

Birth Rate
Average Lifetime
Normal Death Rate
Effect Delay on
Deaths
Effect of TRWR-P
on Deaths Function
Emigration Rate
Effect Delay on
Migration
Effect of TRWR-P
on Migration
Function

Fraction of emigrants per 1000 persons per year
(fraction / year)
Parameter of exponential delay (years)
Table of inputs of Normalized Population
corresponding to crude migration (Dimensionless)
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1

1
(1,0), (1.01,1.15),
(1.02,1.3), (1.03,1.45),
(1.04,1.6), (1.05,1.75)

IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
The results of the model simulation include outputs for Population, Births,
Deaths, and Migration across four scenarios presented in the previous chapter. We used
the Vensim sensitivity analysis function to produce sensitivity graphs of each rate and
level. The investigative questions is addressed separately based on the results of the
simulation, when applicable, and the research conducted for this study.
Results of Simulation Scenarios
Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity was performed on Population, Births, Deaths, and Migration variables
of the baseline Iran model based on the treatment levels in Table 9. Birth rate established
the initial Population (Figure 19) growth increasing from 75 million to 89.4 million
people before decreasing as a result of the Effect of TRWR-P on Migration and the Effect
of TRWR-P on Deaths. The range of Population growth results from the limits of the
Carrying Capacity. The uncertainty of Population increased over time and particularly
following the increase in Migration and Deaths. This behavior is validated through the
realistic uncertainty occurring after a major event such as a natural disaster or war.
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Figure 19: Population Sensitivity Graph – Baseline
Births (Figure 20) and Population shared the same sensitivity since Birth Rate reinforces
the Population through feedback. Births followed the same uncertainty as Population
because Births was the only reinforcing feedback in the model. Realistically, birth rates
do fluctuate in a population experiencing a major event, particularly when health care is
limited as a regulator of disease. Birth rates can also be affected by malnourishment if
food and water supplies are restricted or contaminated.
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Figure 20: Births Sensitivity Graph – Baseline
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The variable Deaths (Figure 21) increased sensitivity as a result of Effect of TRWR-P on
Deaths and Effect of TRWR-P on Migration. Lower values (years) of Effect of TRWR-P
on Deaths and Effect of TRWR-P on Migration allowed both Effect of TRWR-P on
Deaths and Effect of TRWR-P on Migration Functions to maximize the reinforcing effect
from Birth Rate on the population. The death rate of a population can vary for several
reasons. Deaths are mainly attributed to life expectancy, but conflict and war can increase
the death rate for those younger adult age categories, especially males. The uncertainty in
Deaths from this simulation indicates significant variability within the 75 to 100 percent
range.
The variable Migration (Figure 22) exhibited similar sensitivity as Deaths,
although the Migration values were higher due to the order of magnitude increases in the
Effect of TRWR-P on Migration Function. The uncertainty of migration rates have been
discussed considerably in this study and are largely due to improved livelihoods through
increasing economic opportunities. The variability of uncertainty for Migration between
75 and 100 percent appears lower than the variability in the same range for Deaths.
However, the variability of Migration is clearly increased between 95 and 100 percent
uncertainty compared to Deaths. The cause of increased variability in this particular
range is unknown.
The sensitivity of this model was determined largely through the parameters
Effects Delay on Migration (and Deaths) that either shortened or lengthened the model’s
response to the Effects of TRWR-P on Migration (and Deaths) Function. The length of
each delay was essential to simulating the actual migration and death rates in the Syria
and Iran model.
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Figure 21: Deaths Sensitivity – Baseline
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Figure 22: Migration – Baseline

Simulation Results
The results from simulating each of the four scenarios are shown in Figure 23,
Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 26. The tuned factors for Vensim simulations are
presented in Table 12. The baseline output (Figure 23) indicates a migration of 3.8
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million and 0.5 million deaths from 2018 to 2019. Migration and deaths follow the Effect
of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions with no delay. This outcome follows the
delay of 1 year, as input, but does not adhere to the refugee return rate forecasted by the
UN. The increase of Migration and Deaths at year 2031 indicate the Population level
triggered the Effect of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions. This behavior may
be desirable if the migration and death rates were to respond within a year of some
underlying cause. However, the widely accepted S-shaped growth (or decay) curve is not
evident, and therefore this population response is unrealistic.
Table 12: Vensim Simulation Outcome – Factors
Scenario
Vensim Opt.
Population
Vensim Opt.
Migration

Effect Delay on
Migration

Effect Delay on
Deaths

Carrying
Capacity

1.87

10

86.6 million

1

10

86.95 million
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Figure 23: Simulation Output – Baseline
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Births, Deaths, Migrants (millions)

Simulation Output: Baseline

The simulation output using the Effect on Migration and Deaths Delays (2.1 and
2.7 years, respectively) from the Syria validation model (Figure 24) resulted in a more
realistic response according to the UN World Population Prospect 2017 refugee return
rates. Again Carrying Capacity was set to 86.6 million, the estimated population of Iran
when 95 percent of TRWR-A was consumed (in the year 2047). This study cannot
assume the model’s exponential delay for Migration and Deaths include refugee returns
considering available refugee return rates recorded by UNHCR sites include only those
returnees who seek UN assistance as they return to their country of origin [87]. As
previously mentioned, Migration and Deaths are all inclusive; separate subcategories for
water and conflict related migrants and deaths were not modeled.
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Figure 24: Simulation Output – Syria Optimal
The simulation output using Vensim Optimization function (Figure 25) performed
similarly to the model using the Syria validation model in terms of Migration and
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Population levels. Since the software optimized Population, the Effect Delay on
Migration (and Death) parameters were optimized. The software set Effect Delay on
Migration to 1.87 years and Effect Delay on Deaths to 10 years. The Effect Delay on
Deaths caused deaths to be distributed over a 10-year period, which is plausible given
victimization from long-term conflict and/or contraction of water-borne viruses, but
unlikely at such a constant rate. The uncertainty of Deaths shown in the sensitivity
analysis in Figure 21 indicate there would be more variability in the number of deaths.
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Figure 25: Simulation Output – Population Opt.
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Figure 26: Simulation Output – Migration Opt.
The simulation output using Vensim Optimization function (Figure 26)
maximized Migration over time that resulted in a different Population response.
Migration increased at a lower rate than for the Syrian Optimal or Population Opt.
simulations, but resulted in a higher peak Migration. The software tuned the Effect Delay
on Migration to one year, the Effect Delay on Deaths to 10 years, and the Carrying
Capacity to 86.95 million persons. As mentioned previously with the Syrian Optimal
simulation, the Effect Delay on Deaths set to 10 years is plausible, but unlikely.
Additionally, retaining the same carrying capacity over the simulation period
resulted in “activating” the Effect of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions more
than once. This translates to water resources remaining constant over time, which may or
may not be accurate. Allowing this simulation behavior in the model, however, may
identify other endogenous issues if migration and death rates were disaggregated or
parameterized.
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Investigative Questions Answered
The following were the questions posed at the beginning of this study in order to
investigate the interdependencies between water security, migration, and conflict:
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas?
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify Iran’s water security?
3. Does the amount of per capita renewable water resources available (TRWR-P)
serve as a trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within Iran?
Question 1: Possible Drivers
This question was largely investigated through the literature review. Specific
examples of social, economic, political, and environmental drivers in Syria and Iran were
showcased. Socially, water has been a generally abundant resource to populations in the
MENA region, and the people have a long history of controlling water resources through
millennia-old technologies such as the qanat. This abundance has permitted cultures to
endure long drought periods as well as devastating floods. However, as populations
increase due to advanced technologies, improved hygiene and sanitation, and state health
care, natural recharge rates decline resulting in increased demand on fuel. People,
especially rural dwellers, have less resources to maintain their existing lifestyle and over
time are led to make decisions to move.
Economically, populations are increasingly adapting to urban lifestyles as more
people move towards cities. Increases in urban populations stress employment
opportunities, infrastructure, and basic services for existing and transient people. As
resources become stressed, the economy is stressed to keep pace with migrants and
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internally displaced people. Politically, a government can exacerbate these stressors by
applying untimely and inappropriate measures such as reducing or ending subsidies for
essential services and resources such as fuel, fertilizer, or water. Frustrated, dissident
groups may rise in power over limited resources in efforts to denounce government
responses. Horizontal inequalities such as employment, education, land ownership, and
basic services existing within groups may lead to protests, infighting, corruption, or
conflict. Finally, the environment may suffer. Governments, especially those of low to
middle class economies, which fail to manage or control resources may resort to more
drastic solutions such as over abstraction of renewable groundwater, exploitation of fossil
aquifers, and over damming to increase surface waters. Such solutions lead to
biodiversity depletion through loss of green water, pollution of existing water sources,
and eutrophication.
The sustainable goals set by the World Bank focus on governments’
accountability for water resource management, preparation for water-related risks, and
capability of water delivery services. These goals are echoed through the numerous
narratives, studies, and news articles supporting this study. Corrupt governments that
mismanage resources due to a lack of expertise and observed data have been proven to
fail to protect their populaces during droughts and floods. Similarly, those same
governments struggle to maintain sufficient and quality water supplies via reliable
infrastructure.
Question 2: Available Water Resource Data
Many MENA countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Qatar, and U.A.E.
understand and have improved their water security. The increase use of desalination,
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inter-basin water transfers, and groundwater monitoring are commonplace in such
countries, which inherently enable the government to provide water through proper
management. Regardless, countries such as Iran and especially Syria are experiencing the
effects of water insecurity due to mismanagement and unsustainable practices. Water data
have historically been estimated through measurement of surface flows, groundwater
tables, precipitation, as well as all the watershed and water cycle variables provided.
Many of these estimates are based on long-term averages of previous measurements of
which the dates are unknown [3], [82].
The available water data used in this study included those long-term average data.
Calculating the percentage of TRWR-A based on consumption was performed with four
data points. All water data used was sourced from the UN’s AQUASTAT website, which
was referenced by nearly all water research, except for those researchers fortunate to have
direct measurement capability or access to the source. Denser data foster increased
dependence and relevance for models than do sparse data. Iran possesses and offers
regional water data for public use and research [96] and has been accessed and referenced
by researchers [45]. The World Resource Institute leaned heavily on UN AQUASTAT
data for their Aqueduct Global Maps 2.1 project to determine water risk indicators [82].
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Research on water storage and usage is increasingly being conducted using data obtained
through satellite observation as technologies become more accurate and precise. The
GRACE project has continued to provide increasing levels of both accuracy and precision
in order to deliver enhanced resolution groundwater storage products for analysis (Figure
27). Improvements such as this are encouraging to researchers attempting to realistically
model and predict and track natural seasonal variances and anthropogenic effects.

Figure 27: Increase in GRACE Resolution
The data used in this study, particularly TRWR-A and TRWR-P fail to address
Iran’s water security with a measurable degree of certainty. Modeling the water security
in Syria required several key assumptions. The long-term average TRWR-A has not been
affected by known reductions in rainfall quantities. Rainfall directly affects IRWR as
precipitation is absorbed into the ground, infiltrating the alluvial flows, seeping into other
water sources, evaporating into the atmosphere, or running off into waterways. The value
of TRWR-A includes groundwater abstraction, which is typically measured through well
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water withdrawals. Governments may or may not track every well, and attempts to
license wells so as to monitor withdrawal rates are not reliable. Surface water flow in a
country such as Iran which has a large quantity of dams for hydroelectric power
generation and irrigation for agricultural purposes may or may not be affected, especially
if transboundary surface flows upstream are dammed as well.
Question 3: TRWR-P as a Potential Trigger
The total renewable water resources per capita available is a quotient of TRWR-A
and the current population. As previously mentioned, TRWR-A is a long-term average.
Population is an aggregated total of all TRWR users: agricultural, industrial, and
municipal. UN AQUASTAT divides TRWR-A between agriculture, industrial, and
municipal usages based on available observations, government or otherwise, and
modelled estimations. UN AQUASTAT data is labeled with a variety of dates—many
older than a decade. The infrequency of data updates is cause for concern when relying
on this TRWR-P data as a potential trigger for migration and/or conflict.
TRWR-P could be a potential indicator if a well-defined lower bound were
identified and accepted for an entire population or if TRWR-P were disaggregated to
state or local users. The UN-defined range of water scarcity addresses populations with
less than 1000 m3 per person annually (and absolute scarcity at 500 m3 per person
annually) is without explanation. There is correlation with this definition and the
estimated 825 m3 per person annually Syrians experienced in 2007 during a multi-year
drought preceding civil war and mass migration. However, the proximity in time to the
outbreak of conflict and migration in conjunction with the aggregated TRWR-P fail to
support causation. Furthermore, agricultural, industrial, and municipal withdrawal and
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consumption data would be necessary to increase the validity of TRWR-P considering
variance between agricultural users in rural farming areas and urban dwellers.

83

V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to investigate the interdependencies of water
security, migration, and conflict through research and a system dynamics modeling
methodology in order to inform military planners and strategists about their influences on
future military operations. The research addressed three investigative questions primarily
concerning water security as a way to begin modeling interdependent variables.
The research conducted was informative; it incorporated several dynamic global
issues previously studied separately, or in pairs, but not as an entirety. One of the key
aspects of water security are the sustainability goals established by the World Bank.
Those include resource sustainability and efficiency management, reliability and
affordability of services, and risk management of potential water-related events.
Governments working towards these goals are currently reducing their probabilities of
experiencing water insecurity and subsequent migration and/or conflict.
Modeling the effects due to the total renewable water resources per capita
improved our understanding of the problem’s complexity. The uncertainty determined
through sensitivity analysis identified unanticipated endogenous behavior that appeared
to be directly related to the delay of migration and death rates. The population decrease
from the actual migration and death rates increasing over time highlights the potential
response. Finally, the decay of migration and death rates over time indicates a realistic
human response as conditions improve.
Further work would enhance the research and modeling efforts presented in this
study. Potentially data-rich sources direct from government sites in Iran or high
resolution satellite observations from projects such as GRACE may offer extensive
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adaptations. Improving the underrepresented conflict topic in the model using Political
Instability Task Force (PITF) data may increase realism by disaggregating migration and
death rates. Specific modeling of horizontal inequalities including civil liberties, level of
democracy, GDP per capita, availability of primary education, and employment rates
along with these specific water data overlaid with geospatial data could localize water
security and help forecast future migration and conflict.
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Appendix A: System Dynamics Validation Tests (Source: Zagonel)
System’s Mapping
1. Face validity (structural assessment through deductive process) – Q: Is the
model structure consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of the system?
2. Validity of decision rules (structural focus) – Q: Do the decision rules capture
the behavior of the actors in the system?
Quantitative Modeling
3. Physical conservation – Q: Does the model conform to basic physical laws such
as conservation laws?
4. Dimensional consistency – Q: Is each equation dimensionally consistent
without the use of parameters having no real world meaning?
5. Integration error – Q: Are the results sensitive to the choice of time step or
numerical integration method?
6. Extreme conditions tests (equations focus) – Q: Does each equation make sense
even when its inputs take on extreme conditions?
7. Parameter assessment – Q: Do all parameters have real world counterparts? Are
they consistent with relevant descriptive and numerical knowledge of the system?
8. Basic-behaviors reproduction – Q: Does the model generate the various modes
of behavior observed in the system?
9. Endogenous behavior-reproduction tests – Q: Does the model pass behavioral
reproduction tests without the aid of exogenous inputs driving the model in
predetermined ways?
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10. Boundary adequacy tests (modes of behavior) – Q: Does the behavior of the
model change significantly when boundary assumptions are relaxed?
11. Qualitative problem-behavior test – Q: Does the model qualitatively
reproduce the behavior(s) of interest in the system?
12. Boundary adequacy test (problem endogeneity) – Q: Are the important
concepts for addressing the problem endogenous to the model?
13. Validity of decision rules (policy focus) – Q: Do the decision rules capture the
behaviors of the actors in the system? (policy focus)
14. Assessment of surprise behaviors – Inspection for unusual, novel, unexpected
or surprise behaviors. Q: Does the model generate previously unobserved or
unrecognized behavior? Does the model successfully anticipate the response of
the system to novel conditions?
15. Behavior sensitivity analysis – Q: Do the modes of behavior generated by the
model change significantly when assumptions about parameters, boundary, and
aggregation are varied over the plausible range of uncertainty?
16. Extreme conditions tests (model behaviors focus) – Q: Does the model
respond plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, shocks, and parameters?
17. Behavior anomaly tests (changed assumptions tests) – Q: Do anomalous
behaviors result when assumptions of the model are changed or deleted?
18. Family member (generalizability) – Ability to generalize. Q: Can the model
generate the behavior observed in other instances of the same system?
Uncertainty Analysis
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19. Quantitative sensitivity analysis – Q: Do the numerical values change
significantly when assumptions about parameters, boundary, and aggregation are
varied over the plausible range of uncertainty?
20. Policy sensitivity analysis – Q: Do the policy implications change
significantly when assumptions about parameters are varied over the plausible
range of uncertainty? Is the level of aggregation appropriate?
21. Boundary adequacy tests (policy implications) – Q: Do the policy
recommendations change when the model boundary is extended?
Forecasting And Optimization
22. Behavior correspondence – Q: Does the model quantitatively reproduce the
behavior(s) of interest in the system?
23. Behavior prediction – Pattern prediction, event prediction, shifting-mode
prediction 24. Changed-behavior prediction (prior to worry about number
forecast; behavioral forecast)
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Appendix B: System Dynamics Test Components Chart

(Source: Zagonel)
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